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Abstract
This research examines the pricing tool reverse auctioning. In a reverse auction
buyer's state the item they wish to buy and the sellers compete with each other for the
sale, driving the price steadily down until no seller is willing to go any lower. Darleen A.
Druyun, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition and
Management, Washington, D.C., launched the Air Force acquisition reform "Lightning
Bolts" initiatives. These initiatives jump-start acquisition reform to find processes
leading towards a better, faster, and cheaper way of conducting business. A reverse
auction is one of these processes. A review of the extant literature shows that reverse
auctioning has been utilized in the commercial sector since 1994, covering thousands of
types of items.
Preliminary research explored the appropriateness of reverse auctioning in
Information Technology. Recent studies indicate the use of reverse auctioning should be
expanded beyond Information Technobgy. Air Force acquisition professionals have
utilized reverse auctioning as the pricing technique for twenty procurements, nearly all
for the procurement of low price Information Technology. This research will assist
acquisition professionals in better understanding the challenges related to the use of the
reverse auction beyond low price Information Technology.

HOW CAN THE AIR FORCE MAXIMIZE THE VALUE OF
REVERSE AUCTIONING AS A PRICING TECHNIQUE?

I.

INTRODUCTION

Background
More than twenty Fortune 500 companies have used reverse auctions since 1994.
These include Caterpillar, Procter & Gamble, United Technologies and Zenith (Rafter,
98). Additionally, the Department of Defense (DOD) has used reverse auctions since
May 2000 (NAVICP, 2000). DOD has completed several successful implementations of
the reverse auction process focusing primarily on procuring low cost, Information
Technology (IT) items. Reverse auctioning is an acquisition reform initiative that is of
great potential value to the acquisition workforce due to the current acquisition
environment highlighted by workforce reductions and budget constraints. This thesis
describes the potential to expand the use of reverse auctions beyond the procurement of
low cost IT products.
The Acquisition Environment
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 and the ClingerCohen Act of 1996 are enabling the DOD to find ways to reduce costs and to simplify
processes. The FASA focuses on (1) reducing unique purchasing requirements; (2)
increasing the use of simplified acquisition procedures; and (3) obtaining goods and
services faster while reducing in-house procedures. The Information Technology
Management Reform Act (ITMRA) and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA)

together are known as the Clinger-Cohen Act and further advance the changes made by
FAS A. The Clinger-Cohen Act provides opportunities for the DOD to further streamline
and reduce non-value added steps in the acquisition process. The FARA mandates
compliance with 41 U.S.C. 404, which states that government-wide procurement policies,
regulations, and procedures should promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in
procurements made by the executive branch of the federal government (41 U.S.C. 404).
This mandate has led the DOD to use this reverse auction pricing technique, although in a
very limited manner.
Purpose and Objective of Research
This research identifies and examines the factors for establishing and
implementing the reverse auctioning pricing technique. The objective is to determine
whether this pricing technique's use may be broadened and to provide guidance for its
expansion. Additionally, guidance will be developed to assist procurement professionals
in determining if a reverse auction is appropriate for a given procurement action.
Methodology
To accomplish the objectives stated above, this research uses a qualitative,
comparative analysis case study. The case studies consist of an examination of
contractual documents and interviews with the personnel that conducted four reverse
auctions. The data was analyzed to find themes and patterns that occurred during the
reverse auctions. The theoretical content of the research was established through
literature review, examining the possible expanded use of this tool A comparative
analysis was conducted to examine the strength of the explanation provided by the
findings and to determine the validity of the research.

Summary
The Air Force and commercial companies have implemented reverse auctioning
as a pricing tool for many types of acquisitions. Due to the mandate to promote
efficiency and effectiveness in procurements, this research examines reverse auctioning
to determine if further use of the technique is feasible.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Definition of Reverse Auction
Harris defines reverse auctions as a twist on the more familiar "forward" auction,
in which interested buyers bid against one another for an item until the one willing to pay
the highest price is left standing (Harris, 01). In a reverse auction, a single buyer solicits
bids from multiple suppliers of a product. Those suppliers then bid the price down until
the one willing to sale at the lowest price remains (Harris, 01). Merson defines a reverse
auction as the opposite of a traditional auction (Merson, 00). In a traditional auction, a
seller offers an item or items for sale while potential buyers compete with each other for
the purchase, driving the price steadily up until no buyer will bid any higher. In a reverse
auction, multiple sellers of products vie for the business of a single buyer, thereby driving
the price down. Bidding continues until a pre-established bidding period ends or until no
seller will bid any lower (Merson, 00).
A news release from Randolph Air Force Base, the Air Force Personnel Center,
describes reverse auctioning, also known as online auctioning, as different from the
standard Air Force procurement practice. Reverse auctioning allows the bidders to see
their competitors' bids, while concealing the company's identity. Reverse auctioning
allows bidders to actively compete through submission of multiple price proposals.
History of Commercial Use
Commercial businesses have used reverse auctions since 1994 (Rafter, 98). With
the increased use of the Internet, information technology enables companies to host
internet-based reverse auctions. This use of information technology allows businesses to

save time and money in conducting reverse auctions. Reverse auction service providers
put billions of dollars in products and services on the auction block creating huge savings
for commercial companies (Jap, 00). In 1998, reverse auction provider Freemarkets
Online accumulated more than 20 Fortune 500 companies as customers with more than
1,000 suppliers taking part in the reverse auctions. These reverse auctions allowed
customers to save an average of 17 percent (Rafter, 98).
Commercial Application
EDS Canada (one of the largest professional IT firms in Canada) used a reverse
auction for a large contract labor buy. They had 20 different technical contract labor
suppliers and wanted to reduce this to a single primary supplier and one backup quickly.
Their solution consisted of issuing a Request For Proposal (RFP) on 2 Feb 00 followed
by an electronic reverse auction (Atkinson, 00).
The RFP contained a request for information on 30 different job descriptions for
three different regions of the country, and a breakdown for two different classifications,
including an hourly rate and a markup rate. The company initially focused on qualitative
information rather than price. They made this clear to potential vendors by stating that
only qualitative parameters would be considered to make the potential reverse auction
players list, the "short list" (Atkinson, 00).
EDS Canada sent out 35 RFPs and received 22 responses. The company shortlisted this to six within one week after receiving the supplier responses. Ranking and
weighing qualitative parameters such as value-added services stated in the RFP
accomplished this. The six finalists received training on the auctioning process and were

reminded their bids were considered along with the qualitative information (Atkinson,
00).
Next, a practice run reverse auction allowed suppliers the opportunity to see if
their technology worked and let them become comfortable with the reverse auction
process. During the practice reverse auction, the Local Area Network (LAN) crashed.
This did not result in a catastrophic failure of the process since safeguards were put in
place (Atkinson, 00).
These safeguards included:
a. A back-up LAN and internet service;
b. Cellular phones, in case the phone line becomes unavailable;
c. A backup computer, allowing the provider to act on behalf of the
supplier;
A directed message system was developed:
a. In case of an inappropriate bid a directed message can be sent to the
supplier.
b. To ensure suppliers were not experiencing technical complications.
The reverse auction was set for two hours, with four 15-minute extensions. The
reverse auction received 996 bids from the six suppliers during the three-hour period.
EDS Canada then short-listed to two suppliers based on the reverse auction bid, in-person
presentations conducted the week following the reverse auction, and qualitative factors.
They selected a primary supplier and a substitute, awarding both with two-year contracts.
The process took approximately two months versus a historical six-month process for a
similar procurement (Atkinson, 00).

Commercial enterprise does not limit the use of reverse auctioning to a specific
type of acquisition. Many commercial companies today use online reverse auctions to
procure everything from raw materials and transportation services to engineered parts,
springs, molded plastics, and stampings (Jap 00). Market research from major
corporations indicates reverse auctioning has a long-term place in their e-Business
strategy. Hence, many corporations are negotiating substantial long-term contracts with
reverse auction service providers (Snyder, 00).
Government Applications
"Lightning Bolts" tasked the Air Force's acquisition personnel to find processes
that lead towards a better, faster, and cheaper way of conducting business. Building a
21st century military capable of meeting the 21st century mission, requires an acquisition
system that provides the United States Air Force with the highest quality goods in the
most affordable and efficient manner possible. This reengineered acquisition system
focuses on managing suppliers, rather than supplies (Dickey, 01).
Prior to 1997, the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) prohibited the use of
reverse auctioning by government personnel. Upon review, the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy (OFPP) determined this prohibition was not in the government's best
interest. The OFPP officials lifted the ban in the FAR and gave government procurement
officials a chance to achieve the private sector's success. In 1997, the FAR rewrite
allowed government agencies to consider reverse auctions (Harris, 2001).
The military services rapidly adopted reverse auctioning in 2000. In February
2001, SAF/AQC, signed a memorandum stating the concept of reverse auctions emerged
as a potentially viable contract pricing tool. The memorandum encourages acquisition

personnel to use reverse auctions in situations where it is appropriate. This approach
allows the Air Force to gain insight into the appropriateness of reverse auctions for
certain commodities and services (Scott, 2001).
In 1999, Pennsylvania became the first state to test the on-line reverse auction
process by implementing a pilot program with FreeMarkets, a reverse auction service
provider. The pilot program included three reverse auctions to procure coiled aluminum,
anthracite coal, and road salt. Pennsylvania's Department of General Services estimates
saving taxpayers $3.7 million through the use of the reverse auction pilot program. The
pilot program was expanded to include commodity purchases in which savings of $ 11
million are estimated (Ritchie, 1999).
In 2000, the United States Postal Service was the first federal agency to undertake
the reverse auction process (Matthews, 00). They first bought envelopes and then leased
5,000 trucks through reverse auctions. This reduced their truck leasing costs by 12.5
percent while upgrading the quality of their truck fleet in the process (Harris, 01).
The Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) conducted their first reverse
auction on 5 May 2000 to procure recovery sequencers that are described as the brains of
the Advanced Concept Ejection Seat for the B-1 bomber and F-15, F-16, and F-117
fighter aircraft. Offers were received from three potential suppliers and the Navy
estimates achieved reductions of 28.9 percent (nearly $1 million) (Hicks, 00). The
NAVSUP continues using reverse auctions and finds a main benefit is they can make a
contract award within an hour of the reverse auction. This compares with several weeks
in the standard procurement process (Seffers, 00). Table 1 summarizes five reverse
auctions conducted by NAVSUP with reported savings of $14.8M.

NAVSUP: Completed Reverse Auctions
Item

Evaluation Criteria

Date

Reported Savings

Recovery
Sequencers

Price Only

5-May-00

$932K or 28%

Shipboard
Berthing

Technical
Acceptable/Low Price

30-Jun-00

$2.8Mor22%

T-56 Engine
Blades

Price Only

3-Aug-00

$1.2Mor17%

Mobile MRI
Services

Best Value

18-Aug-00

Award to other than
the low, no savings.

CVN Camels

Best Value

7-Sep-00

$9.9M or 27%

Table 1

Source: NAVSUP handout,
FAI/DAU Reverse Auction Lunchtime Seminar, October 3, 2000

The Air Force conducted their first three reverse auctions on 3 Aug 00 to purchase
computer equipment. The three auctions resulted in estimated savings of 27% or $88K.
Continuing success with the procurement of Information Technology (IT) was found as
one auction provided savings of $60,200 or 23% below the General Services
Administration (GSA) schedule price and included an option to increase the order
quantity by 15% after the auction. These IT reverse auctions lasted approximately 35
minutes each with awards placed with the lowest bidder (Seffers, 00).
The III Corps and Fort Hood Contracting Command conducted the Army Forces
Command's first reverse auction. They estimate a 10.67% price reduction under the
estimated product price and a significant increase in quality. The requirement was for
forty Pentium III computers with peripheral computer equipment. All requirements were
met or exceeded with four GSA small business vendors participating in the process. The
four vendors were selected through market research on existing GSA schedule holders

who supply computer equipment. Fort Hood spent approximately six days preparing for
the auction and the delivery order was signed the same day the auction was completed.
Fort Hood is satisfied with the auction process and has plans for expanding its use
(Calderon, 01).
The Air Force has taken the first steps toward securing reverse auction enabling
services. The Air Force partnered with the Army's Communications-Electronics
Command and entered into a licensing agreement with Frictionless, a reverse auction
service provider, through the end of December 2001. This agreement allowed Air Force
offices to use Frictionless software for conducting reverse auctions (AF Acquisition
Newsletter, 2001). As of 1 January 2002 each Air Force office must obtain funding and
select the reverse auction service provider of their choice.
Long-term Considerations
Cost reductions are noted in many reverse auctions but there is a need to look at
the long-term effect. Some suppliers are able to sustain a sharp price reduction for only a
short period of time. Initially, buyers experience reduced prices when they run a reverse
auction. These savings reduce the supplier companies' profits. Over the long term,
suppliers may not be able to compete at the lower price levels and may eventually be
forced to consolidate or leave the industry. In the end, buyers may lose the advantage of
the reverse auction and the bargaining power will shift to suppliers (Jap, 00).
Buyers can obtain costs reductions but still must consider the defense industrial
base before conducting a reverse auction. The United States' industrial supplier base is
shifting. As the Department Of Defense reduces spending, the defense industrial base
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shrinks (Washington, 99). Reverse auctioning may further reduce the defense industrial
base.
Researching the Market
Prior to implementing a reverse auction, market analysis must be accomplished to
gather, organize, and analyze data and practices in the particular market segment.
Advance preparation is important and must focus more upon the market than the product
or service. The characteristics of a market in which the reverse auction may be
successful follows:
•

At least two competent, competitive suppliers.

•

A clearly defined requirement each competitor finds attractive.

•

Management support for changing suppliers.

Market Research must evaluate if the market warrants a reverse auction and then
determine if suppliers would be willing to participate. All acquis ition strategies are based
on the type of capability being procured, and the type of purchasing relationship depends
on the category of this capability. Kraljic provides four separate categories to classify
items:
•

Criticals

•

Commodities

•

Generics

•

Distinctive

Criticals are the items central to the firm's distinctive technical capability and are
crucial to the buyer's profit margin. The loss, absence, or delay of receipt of these items
may force the organization out of business. A critical item is not readily available in the
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marketplace. It often has limited sources, subject to the complexities and uncertainties of
the environment. This is the most sophisticated partnering relationship, focused on
customer value. Due to the need for a sophisticated partnering relationship and the
availability of limited sources, these high values, high-risk items may not be a viable
candidate for a reverse auction.
Commodities are the products or services, which are part of the high value items
that the firm needs to stay in business. They are similar to critical items but are readily
available in the marketplace. A low risk must be weighed against the high value to the
business. Reverse auctions may be viable for low risk, high value commodities.
Generics are the items that the firm needs to do business. They are readily
available in the marketplace and have little or no distinctive qualities. There is little risk
associated with the procurement of these items and not much value to be gained by
distinguishing one from another. Firms try and minimize the time spent acquiring these
products through elimination, outsourcing, or long-term re-supply contracts. These low
values, low risk items are readily available in the marketplace and may be candidates for
a reverse auction.
Distinctives are products that are over specified. They offer no real value to the
firm but create risk due to their high costs and their unavailability in the marketplace.
They are a bottleneck in the supply chain. Firms should look at distinctive items to see if
they can be eliminated and replaced with an item readily available in the marketplace.
By plotting requirements against concepts of value and risk, an organization can
effectively make a strategic purchasing decision. Figure 1 illustrates the classification of
items described above (Kraljic, 83).
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High

Risk

Distinctives

Criticals

• Strategies: Key suppliers;
design to customer or supplier
specifications; provide
product/market differentiation
• Critical factors:
Manufacturing costs high
when cost and/or quality
problems occur; difficult to
source
• Time horizon: Variable
• Management approach:
Simultaneous engineering and
some "Supplier Partnerships"
• Methods: Reduce number of
products and suppliers
• Agreement: Sole Source
Contract
• Tactics: Decrease uniqueness
of products unless
competitive advantage is
gained

Generics

Commodities

• Strategies:
Standardize/consolidate
• Critical factors: Cost of
acquisition
• Time horizon: Up to one year
• Management approach:
Systems contracts; blanket
orders
• Methods: Reduce number of
buys
• Agreement: Purchase Order
or credit card
• Tactics: Increase use of
technology

Low

• Strategies: Strategic Supplier
Partnerships; design to
customer or supplier
specifications; provide
product/market differentiation
• Critical factors: Manufacturing
costs high when cost and/or
quality problems occur; very
difficult to source
• Time horizon: Ten or more years
• Management approach: Supplier
Partnerships
• Methods: Reduce number of
suppliers
• Agreement: Contract or LongTerm Agreement
• Tactics: Increase role of
suppliers

• Strategies: Leverage spend;
preferred suppliers
• Critical factors: Cost of materials
• Time horizon: Five or more years
• Management approach: Volume
contracting, and some Supplier
Partnerships
• Methods: Reduce number of
suppliers
• Agreement: Purchase Order or
Long-Term Agreement
• Tactics: Increase business
volume with fewer suppliers

-Value (cost, service, innovation).

Figure 1: Typology of Capabilities Acquired (Kraljic, 1983)
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High

Supplier-Buyer Relationships
A study was conducted on the results of six auctions conducted in which goods
worth a half-billion dollars changed hands (Jap, 00). The study showed the reverse
auction process tended to undermine the buyer-supplier relationship. Sellers felt
exploited by the process and were less trusting of the buyer. Suppliers stated the reverse
auctions took away a mutually beneficial supplier-buyer relationship. Suppliers worked
hard to achieve and maintain a good relationship with the buyers and felt it was not fair to
compete for a bid in the reverse auction environment. Reverse auctions may damage
business relationships, ultimately eroding the economic performance of both buyer and
supplier (Jap, 00).
Before implementing strategic purchasing procedures, the organization needs to
understand the various supplier relationships. Categories of the buyer-seller relationship
follow (Cavinato, 92):
1. Don't know supplier exists and don't care.
2. Don't know supplier exists but might use them if they did know.
3. Arm's length, price-oriented relationship: low value, low risk of obtaining in
the marketplace, traditional (i.e. taxicab ride).
4. Price relationship; cooperative from time to time (i.e., returning pallets to the
supplier to reduce the price of the next shipment).
5. Price relationship; collaborative over time (i.e., sharing demand forecasts with
suppliers so they can level their manufacturing; helps reduce costs).
6. Total cost relationship; cooperating on total supply chain to reduce total cost
(i.e., providing performance rather than product specifications to supplier so
they can reduce manufacturing costs).
7. Value relationship; linking supplier to customers to emphasize product/service
value.
8. Joint ventures; complementary relationships uniting strong/weak attributes of
companies.
9. Vertical integration strategies:
a) purchasing capital assets for suppliers;
b) buying supplier and treating as a subsidiary;
c) complete vertical integration of the capability.
The first three relationships identified are based on an arm's length, lowest price
14

relationship. These items are currently considered good candidates for reverse auctions.
Item numbers 4, 5, and 6 are expected to see cost reduction relationships associated with
these items. Reverse auctioning may be a good candidate for the procurement of these
items in the future. Items 7, 8, and 9 are not considered viable candidates for a reverse
auction due to a more sophisticated buyer-seller relationship.
Reverse Auction Service Providers (Merson, 2000)
A service provider (enabler) is the company providing the reverse auction service.
Many different companies offer reverse auction services. It is important to select an
enabler that best fills the agency's needs since the enablers provide a wide range of
services, from making available software for implementing a reverse auction to providing
full service. Full service providers have the capacity to fulfill the following:
Provide market security, global connectivity, and network management;
Conduct the auction with proven technology in real time without delays;
Accommodate multiple bidding formats;
Extend the auction when active bidding makes it appropriate;
Provide recovery procedures in the event of technical difficulties;
Provide relevant special terms and conditions;
Provide expert advice on bundling strategies, bid formats, and other
requirements to promote competition; and
Provide proactive support before, during, and after the bidding process.
Most agencies do not have the technical expertise to conduct their own reverse auction
and rely on a full service enabler. Other criteria that organizations should consider prior
to selecting an enabler are as follows:
The track record of the enabler;
Enabler's knowledge of the market;
The technology used and its flexibility;
Contingency plan for technical or other difficulties;
Training plan for indoctrinating buyers and sellers;
The ability to use other factors besides price in the process;
The ability to work within FAR requirements;
The type of business arrangements required; and
The method and cost of the enabler's service.
15

In the Future
Since September 11th, 2001, it is even more critical that procurement offices find
savings and efficiencies that can provide every possible penny to apply to homeland
defense and the first war of the twenty-first century. It is estimated that an across the
board savings of 10 percent can be achieved buying computers, coal, copying, and
janitorial services using the reverse auction process. This procurement tool could save
over $3 billion on the state and local levels, and as much as $6 billion at the federal level
(Wyld, 02).

16

III. METHODOLOGY

Research Strategies
There are five research strategies in the social sciences (Yin, 1994:4). Table 2
provides an overview of the appropriate research methodology associated with each of
these strategies.
Strategy

Form of Research
Question

Requires Control Over
Behavioral Events?

Focuses on
Contemporary Events

Experiment

How, why

Survey

Who, what, where, No
how many, how
much

Yes

Archival Analysis

Who, what, where, No
how many, how
much

Yes/No

History
Case Study

How, why
How, why

No
Yes

Yes

No

No
No

Table 2. Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies (Yin 1994:6)
The methodology used in this research is the case study. The research question is
"How can the Air Force maximize the value of reverse auctioning as a pricing
technique?" This question focuses on contemporary events and does not require control
over behavioral events.
Case Study Definition
A case study allows for an investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful
characteristics of real-life events (Yin, 1994:3). Case study uses direct observation and
systematic interviewing to include a full variety of evidence such as documents,
interviews, and observation (8). The central tendency of a case study is to illuminate a
set of decisions: i.e. why a decision was taken, how it was implemented, and what were
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the results (12). Case studies can be based on quantitative data, qualitative evidence, or a
combination of the two (14). A case study investigates a contemporary phenomenon
within real- life context; even if the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not
clearly defined (1).
Yin identifies five applications of the case study. The most important application
is to help explain the causal links in real- life interventions that are too complex for a
survey. A second application is to describe an intervention and the real- life context in
which it occurred. The third application is to illustrate certain topics within an
evaluation. The fourth application is to explore those situations in which the intervention
being evaluated has no clear, single set of outcomes. The final application is metaevaluation, which is a study of an evaluation study. The constant theme in all
applications is the program sponsor plays a prominent role in defining the evaluation
questions and relevant data categories (Yin, 1994:15).
Case Study Research Design
There are four types of designs for case studies: single-case holistic designs,
single-case embedded designs, multiple-case holistic designs, and multiple-case
embedded designs (See Table 3).
Single-Case
Designs

Multiple-Case Designs

Holistic (single unit TYPE 1
of analysis)

TYPE 3

TYPE 2

TYPE 4

Embedded
(Multiple units of
analysis)

Table 3. Basic Types of Designs for Case Studies (Yin, 1994:39)

The design chosen for this research is multiple-case and embedded. A multiplecase study allows for the comparison of more than one case in predicting and/or
producing results (Yin, 1994:45). The multiple-case study allows us to look at cases that
will predict similar results or produce contrasting results for predictable reasons (46-47).
An advantage of the multiple-case study is the evidence is often considered more
compelling and regarded as being more robust than in the single case effort (45). This
research uses the embedded approach in conducting analysis. The embedded design
involves more than one unit or sub-unit of analysis (51).
The following model serves as the basis for conducting this research analysis
(Figure 2). In brief, all cases are developed separately which allows for a cross-case
comparison and a final report of cross-case conclusions.
Quality of the Research Design
Validity and reliability measure the quality of a research design. Validity is the
appropriateness, meaningfulness, and usefulness of the inferences made from the
measures. Reliability is the degree to which the observed data is free from errors of
measurement (Dooley, 2001:76).
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These two factors are further broken down by Yin in three "tests" to ensure
standards of quality are met. These tests measure internal validity, external validity, and
reliability (Yin 1994:33). Internal validity occurs in the data analysis phase and is
accomplished by using pattern matching. External validity is to determine if the research
study's findings are generalizable beyond the immediate case study (35). To strengthen
external validity of this research, three cases were studied and cross-case conclusions
formulated, then a fourth case was compared to the findings of the cross-case analysis.
The selection of reverse auctioning cases was by purposive sampling. In
purposive sampling, the researcher chooses which cases to include as opposed to random
sampling (Dooley, 1995:129). The entire population of Air Force reverse auctions is
twenty. There were only four reverse auctions conducted to procure other than
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Information Technology (IT). This research seeks to expand the use ofreverse
auctioning past the procurement of IT; therefore, all four were selected to study in this
research effort. However, the first three cases were compared to each other and the
fourth case compared in contrast with conclusions of the first three.
Documents and research questions are the two methods of data collection used in
this study. The documentation is unobtrusive, exact, and has a long span of time (Yin
1994: 80). Research questions were used to focus directly on reverse auctioning and to
provide perceived causal inferences.
A review was made of the applicable contract file information to obtain market
research findings, potential or actual protests received, contract type, special contract
clauses, and any other significant findings dealing with reverse auctioning. Follow-up
calls may be needed to clarify information received during the data analysis period. To
ensure accuracy of the researcher, after the case is written-up it will be sent to the
respondent for review (Yin 1994: 92).
Investigative Questions
Three investigative areas were focused on in order to answer the research
question, "How can the Air Force maximize the value of reverse auctioning as a pricing
technique?" Each investigative question is restated with the question intent identified
followed by a list of all questions asked in that area.
Investigative Area 1
What is the nature of the Department Of Defense (DOD) competitive market
when using reverse auctioning? The intent of this question is to identify the
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characteristics of a competitive market and determine what type of buyer-supplier
relationship exists.
1. How is the nature of the DOD competitive market affected by reverse
auctioning?
2. How does reverse auctioning affect the type of supplier relationship
that is involved with the item being procured and what type of
relationship is needed?
3. How does reverse auctioning affect the DOD industrial base?
4. How did you determine if your reverse auction was to be restricted and
did you have any problems?
Investigative Area 2
Can the Air Force use reverse auctions for other than low price, information
technology? The intent of this question is to determine what factors, other than low
price, can be considered for award criteria of a reverse auction.
5. What are the award criteria and why was it selected?
Investigative Area 3
What are the primary limitations of the reverse auction process? The intent of this
question is to identify factors that limit the usefulness of a reverse auction.
6. Did you develop any special contract clauses for your reverse auction,
and, if so, what were they?
7. How was the selection of the reverse auction service provider made?
8. What were the primary limitations of the reverse auction process?
Case Study Tactics
Three tactics were used to collect the case study evidence. First, the use of
multiple sources of evidence: documentation and interviews. Documentation was used
to corroborate and augment evidence from other sources (Yin, 1994:81). Interviews were
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conducted on an open-ended basis, to allow respondents to present facts and opinions
about the case study (84). Second, a chain of evidence was established to increase the
reliability of the information. This allows an external observer to trace the steps taken in
these case studies and obtain the same results. Third, a key informant reviewed the draft
case study report. In this research, the reviewers were the actual participants and
informants of the case studies. Data was collected from multiple sources of evidence to
facilitate convergent lines of inquiry; this insures the most accurate data for the research
findings (92).
Reliability assures if a later investigator follows the same procedures, the same
findings will be concluded. "The goal of reliability is to minimize errors and biases in
the study". Case study protocol and the development of a case study database are used to
assure quality documentation during data analysis (Yin 1994, 63).
Case study protocol is essential when using a multiple-case design. Protocol is
intended to guide the researcher in carrying out the case study and is the major tactic in
increasing the reliability of case study research. Protocol includes an overview of the
case study project, field procedures, case study questions, and a guide for the case study
report. Documenting and organizing all of the research information in a study database
increases the reliability of the research (Yin 1994, 94). Protocol was used to establish the
rules that were adhered to during this research. To assure each case study participant was
informed of the same information, the researcher used an e-mail that was sent to all
participants for initial contact (Appendix A). A standard set of open-ended basic
questions was developed that linked directly to the study's research question (Appendix
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B). Each case study participant answered the same research questions to allow for a
comparative analysis.
Data Analysis
Three methods were used for data analysis: mind mapping, pattern matching, and
a comparative analysis. Each is discussed separately.
This research uses mind mapping and is effective for organizing information. The
objective of mind mapping is to create a picture of each reverse auction (Buzan, 93). A
comparative analysis between the reverse auctioning case studies identifies factors that
allow for implementation of the reverse auction. This comparative analysis examines the
strength of each explanation provided.
Internal validity is achieved by establishing a causal relationship, whereby certain
conditions lead to other conditions (Yin, 1994:33). Matching patterns helps establish the
inferences from the data collected are correct. Between case pattern matching
strengthens the internal validity (109-111). In this case, the analytical tactic of pattern
matching will be used to compare an empirically based pattern with a predicted one. If
the patterns coincide, the internal validity of this case study is strengthened (106).
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to present the information gathered and display the
detailed analysis performed on the three case studies. The cross-case findings will then
be compared to a fourth case to see if the cross-case findings are supported. The
objective is to determine whether the reverse auction technique should be broadened and
to provide guidance. This chapter is divided into three main sections. First, an overview
of each case study is presented as it correlates to the investigative questions together with
the development of a mind map. Second, a comparison of the case studies is conducted
using comparative analysis and pattern matching. This helps to identify the factors that
allow implementation of reverse auctioning and evaluate such factors as why a decision
was taken, how it was implemented, and what was its result. Finally, a fourth case is
studied to determine if the findings of the first three cases are supportable.
Case A - Overview
This reverse auction was conducted to procure 35 collar assemblies for the F-16
aircraft. The total estimated cost based on historical buys was $145,425.00. The award
was made to the pre-qualified bidder with the lowest bid of $121,500, a savings of 17%.
Case A - Mind Map
A mind map for the research question responses and acquisition documentation is
shown in Appendix C. The mind map creates a picture that explores all the possibilities
of this reverse auction. This picture provides a good overview and enables us to visualize
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connections. The mind map has the three research investigative central ideas with each
idea becoming the nucleus for a new group of ideas.
Investigative Question 1
The first central idea explored is the nature of the Department Of Defense (DOD)
competitive market.
•

A commercial item is any item, other than real property, that is
customarily used by the general public or other entities for other than
governmental purposes (FAR). Market research was conducted prior
to selecting the reverse auction technique and indicated this item is a
commercial item available in the competitive market.

•

Market research also indicated there are numerous vendors available
for this item. Three vendors pre-qualified to participate in the reverse
auction.

•

Although three vendors pre-qualified to participate in the reverse
auction, only two bidders participated in the actual reverse auction.
The non-participatory bidder stated the entry price was already too
low. This entry price, or reserve price, is the reverse auction starting
price that was set by the Government and stated in the solicitation.

•

Global competition was achieved since one bidder was based in the
Netherlands.

Investigative Question 2
The second central idea explored is the criteria used to award the contract.
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•

The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) defines best value as the
expected outcome of an acquisition that provides the greatest overall
benefit to the requirement. This reverse auction is a best value, price
performance trade-off that allows for the evaluation of criteria other
than cost. Vendors submitted a pre-qualification package that
evaluates factors other than cost such as past performance. This
process allows the contract to be awarded to the vendor providing the
best value to the government.

•

Vendors were informed in the solicitation directions that prequalification was mandatory. The pre-qualified vendors were then
issued a user identification code and password for entry into the
reverse auction software mechanism.

•

Vendors were evaluated on past performance and required to show
they had produced the item within the past three years.

•

One pre-qualified vendor did not participate actively in the reverse
auction because the starting price was already too low. Again, the
Government set this reverse auction starting price, reserve price.

•

Award was made to the low, pre-qualified bidder.

•

Award was made as a result of this reverse auction.

Investigative Question 3
The final central idea explored is the limitations encountered during the reverse
auction process.
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•

In order to conduct this reverse auction, some engineering concessions
were made. Under normal procurement procedures for this item, a
first article is requested under one Contract Line Item Number (CLIN).
Another CLIN contains the production quantity requirement, which is
priced separately from the first article. The reverse auction service
provider could not accommodate two CLINs. Therefore, the first
article requirement was deleted to accommodate one CLIN and
replaced with stringent pre-qualification requirements such as vendors
were required to have produced the item within the past three years.
Additionally, a waiver was processed to allow the deletion of the first
article requirement.

•

The reverse auction pre-qualification process allows the government to
restrict those vendors qualified to participate. Vendors were informed
in the solicitation directions that a pre-qualification was mandatory.
After pre-qualification, vendors were issued a user identification code
and password for entry into the reverse auction software mechanism.

•

In this case the reverse auction service provider trained both
government and vendor pre-qualified bidders. Additionally, the
reverse auction service provider dealt with other issues such as
problems with the reverse auction software and connectivity issues.

•

Two government only reverse auction training sessions were
conducted prior to the real reverse auction. The reverse auction
service provider trained the pre-qualified vendors on the reverse
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auction procedures (one-on-one). Following this training period, a
mock reverse auction was held with all of the participating vendors
and government personnel.
•

The government team members participating in the mock auction
experienced several problems:
1. One vendor was unable to bid. The cause was not determined even
after contacting the reverse auction service provider.
2. One vendor attempted to access the auction during an extended
period. The vendor was informed that the auction had closed when
it still had four minutes remaining.
3. Computer connectivity problems were experienced. There was a
base wide server failure five minutes prior to starting the reverse
auction. The vendors were still able to conduct the reverse auction
without the buyer being able to access the site and get the results.

The reverse auction service provider, prior to the actual auction dates, was not
able to address the concerns of the mock auction. The government team members
participating in the mock auctions recommended numerous software changes to the
reverse auction service provider. Recommendations were forwarded to HQ AFMC/PKL
and SAF/AQC who in turn forwarded the recommendations to the reverse auction service
provider. The service provider, prior to the actual auction dates, could not incorporate
the recommendations that were requested during the mock auctions.
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•

Government personnel depict the reverse auction process as time
consuming because they must actively take part in the reverse auction,
which could take several hours of dedicated participation.

•

Three bidders qualified but only two participated in the reverse
auction. The non-participatory bidder stated that the entry price was
too low and therefore they would not be able to bid.

•

One vendor issued a letter of concern stating the Government was
restricting competition by not allowing them to compete. Although
engineers approved their pre-qualification package they were unable to
meet the additional stringent past performance requirements stated in
the solicitation, which required the vendor to have produced the item
within the past three years. If a first article requirement had been
allowed, the vendor would have been able to participate in the
complete acquisition process.

•

If numerous vendors are participating in the reverse auction and a
problem arises a call may need placed to each vendor immediately.
Therefore, the reverse auction process may require additional
personnel to complete this task.

Case B - Overview
This reverse auction was conducted to procure 54 link assemblies for the B-1B.
The total estimated cost based on historical buys was $207,900.00. The award was made
to the pre-qualified bidder with the lowest bid of $141,750.00, an estimated savings of
32%. Case B was from the same procuring office as Case A. There was only a short
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period between the two auctions and did not allow enough time for "lessons learned"
from the first reverse auction to be incorporated into the second reverse auction.
Case B - Mind Map
A mind map for the research question responses and acquisition documentation is
shown at Appendix D.
Investigative Question 1
The first central idea explored is the nature of the DOD competitive market.
•

Market research was conducted prior to selecting the reverse auction
technique. Market research indicates that this item is a commercial
item available in the competitive market.

•

Market research indicates that there are numerous vendors available
for this item. Three vendors pre- qualified to participate in the reverse
auction.

•

Although three vendors pre-qualified to participate in the reverse
auction, only two bidders participated in the actual auction. Again, the
non-participatory bidder stated that the entry price was already too
low.

Investigative Question 2
The second central idea explored is the criteria used to award the contract.
•

This reverse auction is a best value, price performance trade-off that allows
for the evaluation of criteria other than cost. Vendors were required to submit
the following:
a. Contract Number;
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b. Name and address of procuring contracting officer and buyer;
c. Name and address of cognizant administrative contracting officer;
d. Number of modifications extending delivery date and reason delivery
date was extended, e.g., change in government requirements, etc.;
e. Statement regarding any problems encountered in performing the
contact.
This information, together with information received from other sources, allowed the
government to access present and past performance so a performance risk rating could be
assigned to each offeror's proposal. This process allows the contract to be awarded to the
vendor that provides the best value to the government.
•

Vendors were informed in the solicitation directions that prequalification was mandatory. The pre-qualified vendors were then
issued a user identification code and password for entry into the
reverse auction software mechanism.

•

Award was made to the low, pre-qualified bidder.

•

One vendor submitted a local protest stating they submitted a bid prior
to closing but it was not accepted due to computer sluggishness.
Therefore, the reverse auction results were not used. Instead, the
solicitation allowed the government to request a final proposal revision
and, therefore, vendors submitted their final bid via mail. In the end,
award was made to the low, pre-qualified bidder using the final
proposal revision.
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Investigative Question 3
The final central idea explored is the limitations encountered during the reverse
auction process.
•

In order to conduct a reverse auction, some engineering concessions
were made. Again, the reverse auction service provider is unable to
accommodate a reverse auction with multiple CLINs. Under normal
procurement procedures for this item, a first article is requested under
one CLIN prior to the production quantity, which is priced separately
under another CLIN. Therefore, the first article requirement was
deleted to accommodate one CLIN and replaced with stringent prequalification requirements. The requiring engineers agreed to waive
the first article requirement under specific conditions. First, the
vendors had to submit pre-qualification packages for engineering
evaluation purposes. Second, if the engineers accepted the prequalification package and could ascertain recent production quality,
then the vendors would be allowed to participate in that particular
acquisition. Lastly, with the waiving of the first article requirement,
the contractor was required to comply with the International
Organization of Standardizations (ISO), which promote the
development of international standards and facilitate the exchange of
goods and services worldwide. ISO 9002 was incorporated into the
contract and is applicable to companies that produce and distribute
their products or services (ISO Easy, 2002).
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•

The reverse auction pre-qualification process allows the government to
restrict those vendors qualified to participate. Vendors were informed
in the solicitation directions that a pre-qualification was mandatory.

•

In this case the reverse auction service provider trained both
government and pre-qualified bidders.

•

Two government only reverse auction training sessions were
conducted prior to the reverse auctions. Software concerns and
recommendations were provided to the reverse auction service
provider. The service provider gave pre-qualified vendors training
(one-on-one) of system usage. Following this training period, a mock
reverse auction was held with all of the participating vendors and the
buyer.

•

This reverse auction could not sustain a protest. The Procuring
Contracting Officer (PCO) received a local protest. The protest
complained that lag time between each bid, due to computer
sluggishness, was unacceptable because they were not able to submit
their final bid. The continual need to "refresh" the screen, to ensure
the latest bid was visible, took substantially longer than "real time".
Following are the issues identified by the participating reverse auction
vendor:
1. The auction site from Frictionless, the reverse auction
service provider, did not function as represented within the
demonstration/trial auction. During the trial auction the "Refresh
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Bid History" brought up an automatically updated window (that
refreshed every 5 seconds). This did not happen during the live
auction, making the bidder manually refresh the screen, which took
from 10 seconds to over 3 minutes.
2. The speed of the auction site was sluggish. The vendor
states they have a T- internet connection to allow extremely fast
connection to the Internet. The processing/reply time from this
reverse auction site was comparable to a Dial-up connection. The
vendor claims the reverse auction service provider does not have
sufficient throughput being delivered from the auction provider.
This is not tolerable when dealing with live real-time transactions.
3. The total cycle time from making a bid to being able to
return back to the auction page for the item was never less than 2
minutes.
4. The reverse auction clock counted down to zero and
notified the vendor the auction closed and they appeared to hold
the lowest bid. However, another bidder put in another bid (which
was not posted or visible until screen was updated again). The
vendor was unable to respond to another vendor's lower bid. This
is because the time is not actually live, but gets its update from the
screen refresh and then begins to count down.
The concerns were looked into and the following conclusions were made
by the PCO:
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1. Vendor claims that the auction did not operate as it did during the mock
reverse auction. The reverse auction service provider (Frictionless) stated
that the screen did not change materially in functionality or appearance
from the demonstration auction; however, the software provider did not
dispute the vendor's claim that the duration for refresh took 10 second to
over 3 minutes. Because no government personnel were present during
the demonstration this claim could not be verified.
2. The reverse auction service provider admits (in writing) that the site was
performing slower than usual once the auction started. The PCO was
under the impression the reverse auction was supposed to be live realtime, which did not happen.
3. The reverse auction service provider admits of inconsistencies in the way
that different browsers handle the refresh operation and stated they have
made modifications to the application to eliminate the possibility of this
happening again, regardless of the browser. It was concluded that this was
a problem during the auction and now the reverse auction service provider
has taken action to correct it. Therefore, the PCO determined that the
reverse auction results would not be used and a request for final proposal
revisions was obtained via paper methods.
•

The actual cost savings that may appear to be the result of a reverse
auction may not be the case. The full acquisition cycle needs to be
evaluated to include reverse auction training that requires personnel
resources, cost of processing waivers, and the cost of protests received.
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Case C - Overview
This reverse auction procurement was for a seventy-piece tool kit. The toolkits
include simple hand tools, with two other special tools, a soldering iron with variable
temperature control and wire strippers. These sustainment tools are used for shop and
aircraft maintenance. The solicitation was posted on the Electronic Posting System
(EPS) utilizing a combination Synopsis/Solicitation method allowed by the FAR. Four
vendors submitted the required data.
Case C - Mind Map
A mind map for the research question responses and acquisition documentation is
shown in Appendix E
Investigative Question 1
The first central idea explored is the nature of the DOD competitive market.
•

Market research indicates that there are numerous vendors available
for this item. A solicitation notice was posted on 20 November 2000
with responses and requirement information due by 1 December 2000.
Five vendors submitted data submissions for qualification to
participate in the reverse auction. The reverse auction was held on 6
December 2000 with award made on 12 January 2001.

•

Although five vendors submitted data submissions, only one bidder
participated in the reverse auction The reason for this was contributed
(by the buyer) to the short delivery requirement, which was not
identified during market research.
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•

To be technically acceptable, the items offered had to be acceptable for
the governments intended use as stated in the solicitation acceptance
criteria.

•

The reverse auction requirement description was not adequate.
Therefore, the solicitation was amended to add salient characteristics
retrieved from the Fed Log. This was accomplished for each of the
seventy tools, adding the acceptable brand names and part numbers.

Investigative Question 2
The second central idea explored is the criteria used to award the contract.
•

Vendors were informed in the solicitation directions that a prequalification was mandatory. The pre-qualification required vendors
to meet technical and past performance criteria.

•

Past performance criteria requires the vendors to submit references and
list related work performed. This allowed the government to
discriminate against vendors and award to someone other than the low
bidder.

•

Award was made to the low, pre-qualified bidder.

•

Award was made as a result of this reverse auction.

Investigative Question 3
The final central idea explored is the limitations encountered during the reverse
auction process.
•

There was no guidance or established policies available. This
opportunity allowed the procuring personnel to simplify the process
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from its creation. Appendix G shows the special reverse auction
instructions and agreements that were developed and incorporated into
the solicitation and follow-on contract.
•

The solicitation delivery time requirement was 14 days after receipt of
the award. Although this was clearly stated in the solicitation only one
contractor made their concern known, about the short delivery, prior to
the reverse auction. Because the end user desperately needed these
tool kits, the reverse auction was conducted with hopes that at least
one contractor would participate in the reverse auction.

•

In this case the reverse auction service provider trained both
government and vendor pre-qualified bidders. The education process
took about 10 minutes for each vendor and was conducted by the
reverse auction service provider. Many revisions were made prior to
the actual action starting, and vendors were continually updated to
assure they were thoroughly educated prior to the reverse auction start
time.

•

Five bidders qualified but only one participated in the reverse auction
The starting price was too low for the small businesses to make profit
on the contract.

•

The actual cost savings that may appear to be the result of a reverse
auction may not be the case. The full acquisition cycle needs to be
evaluated to include reverse auction training that requires personnel
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resources, cost of processing waivers, and the cost of the service
provider.
The second part of this chapter conducts a comparative analysis and identifies
similar factors between each case.
Pattern-Matching
Table 4 provides a list of factors identified in this research and correlates the
factors to the research areas as follows:
Investigative Area 1: What is the nature of the DOD competitive market when
using reverse auctioning?
Investigative Area 2: Can the Air Force use reverse auctions for other than low
price, information technology?
Investigative Area 3: What are the primary limitations of the reverse auction
process?
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Commercially Available
Global Competition Received
Numerous Vendors
Received Competition
Firm Fixed Price
Full Service Software Provider
Pre-qualification Required
Market Research Conducted
RA Award
Low Bid
Higher Level Inspection
Past Performance
Pre-qualification
Best Value (PPT)
Technical Criteria
100% SB Set-aside
Protested
Time Consuming
No Control over Connectivity
Training - Government
Training - Vendors

Research Area
1
1
1
1
1
1,3
1
1
2
2
2
2
2,3
2
2
2
2,3
3
3
3
3

Case A
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

Case B
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

CaseC
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Table 4: Pattern Matching
Comparative Analysis
•

Each case studied was for the procurement of a commercial item. This indicates
reverse auctioning should be used to buy items readily available in the
marketplace and supports the theory that reverse auctions should be used for
commercial items.

•

Global competition was received in one of the three cases. This supports the
theory that e-commerce is working to reach a larger, global supplier database.

•

Numerous vendors indicated interest in participating in each of the three cases
studied.

•

Competition was received in only two of the three cases. This indicates that
preliminary market research should be more complete. Expected delivery terms,
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and any unique requirements should be exposed prior to solicitation issuance.
Additionally, the Government should not set the opening bid price and allow the
market to drive the price.
•

All three cases were awarded on a firm fixed pricing arrangement.

•

All three cases used a full-service reverse auction provider. Each provider had
software and hardware problems.

•

In each case the vendor had pre-qualification terms that had to be met prior to the
reverse auction. This supports the theory that reverse auctions can be used to
procure items that include award criteria other than low price alone.

•

Award was made using the results of the reverse auction in only two of the three
cases studied.

•

In each case award was made to the low, pre-qualified bidder.

•

Past performance standards were required in each case.

Conclusions of Cross-Case Analysis
Two areas were identified as critical to the reverse auction process. First, organizations
should assure the reverse auction service provider can support the reverse auction
process. Second, complete market research must be accomplished to provide accurate
information.
It is critical that the proper reverse auction service provider is selected. Problems
experienced in each case study were a direct result of the reverse auction service
provider. In Case B the reverse auction results were not used due to the problems
experienced as a direct result of the reverse auction service provider. In general, reverse
auction service providers were unable to conduct the reverse auctions in real time without
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delays and were unable to accommodate multiple bidding formats. Most agencies do not
have the technical expertise to conduct their own auction and rely on a full service
reverse auction enabler. To avoid problems with reverse auction provider's,
organizations should consider the track record of the enabler; the technology used and its
flexibility and their contingency plan for technical or other difficulties.
A complete investigation of the market should be made during the market
research phase. Vendors must be notified of unique requirements and short delivery
schedules. If they do not know the conditions of the buy-in they may not be willing to
participate in the end. Additionally, the Government should not set a "reserve" price and
allow the market to drive the price downward by the participating vendors.
To increase the external validity of this research a fourth case was studied and the
findings were compared to the cross-case analysis of the first three cases.

Commercially Available
Numerous Vendors
Firm Fixed Price
Full Service Software Provider
Pre-qualification Required
Market Research Conducted
Low Bid
Past Performance
Technical Criteria
Time Consuming
Training - Government
Training - Vendors

Research Area
1
1
1
1,3
1,2,3
1
2
2
2
3
3
3

Case A
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Case B
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

CaseC
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Case D
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Table 5: Comparative Pattern Matching
Case D - Overview
This reverse auction was conducted to procure environmental control systems test
sets for the F-15 aircraft. CLIN 0001AA was for two first articles test units and CLIN

43

0001 AB was for the follow-on production units. Due to funding uncertainties, vendors
proposed production quantities in three increments. Increment A was for the quantity 3444. Increment B was for the quantity 45-55. Increment C was for the quantity of 56-68.
The second CLIN was for data and CLIN 0003 was an option to procure four circuit card
assemblies. This item had never been produced in quantity so a historical price was not
available. The government reported savings of 50% over their market research estimate.
Case D - Analysis and Findings
A mind map for the research question responses and acquisition documentation is
shown in Appendix F. The cross case analysis findings are compared to the findings of
this Case D.
The first central idea explored is the nature of the DOD competitive market.
•

Cases A-C found that reverse auctions should be conducted for
procurement of commercial items available in the competitive market.
Case D supports this finding, as this reverse auction was also for
commercial items available in the competitive market.

•

In cases A-C, more competition was anticipated than received. Case D
supports this as market research indicated 11 vendors were planning
on taking part in the reverse auction. However, only four vendors
submitted bids during the reverse auction.

•

Case D supports the theory provided by cases A-C, reverse auctions
can be conducted to procure firm fixed price contracts.

•

All four cases used a full-service provider. However, each reverse
auction service provider encountered software and hardware problems.
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•

In each case the vendor had pre-qualification terms that had to be met
prior to the reverse auction. This indicates that reverse auctions can be
used to procure items and include award criteria other than price alone.

The second central idea explored is the criteria used to award the contract.
•

In each case, pre-qualifications were required prior to the reverse
auction, which allowed the government to restrict vendors based on
technical criteria, and past performance.

•

Market research revealed there are at least two small businesses that
will participate. Therefore, this procurement was 100% set-aside for a
small business award.

•

In this Case D, the procurement required a first article prior to
producing the production amount. The reverse auction service
provider could handle multiple contract line item numbers to allow for
both a first article and production. The reverse auction service
provider could not do this in Cases A & B.

•

In all cases, award was made to the low, pre-qualified bidder.

•

Award was made as a result of this reverse auction.

The final central idea explored is limitations encountered during the reverse
auction process.
•

The reverse auction service provider plays many critical roles in the
reverse auction process. In this case the service provider trained both
government and vendor pre-qualified bidders. Additionally, the
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service provider deals with other issues such as problems with the
reverse auction software and connectivity issues.
•

Training was first given to government acquisition personnel followed
by training for those vendors that qualified technically.

•

The reverse auction process cannot sustain a protest. Several offerers
complained they had problem timing out when placing bids. This was
the result of the clock freezing on the screen when they entered the
area to type in the bid. Two offerers complained during the auction
and, therefore, the auction was reset and continued until finished.

•

The solicitation required development of two special clauses,
Instruction, Conditions and Notices to offerors and the other entitled
Basis for Contract Award.

•

There is limited participation from vendors that do not want to
participate in a reverse auction. Therefore, maximum competition
may not be received.

Conclusions of Case D Cross Case Analysis
It is critical that the proper reverse auction service provider is selected. Problems
experienced in each case study were a direct result of the reverse auction service
provider. In one case the reverse auction results were not used due to the problems
experienced as a result of the reverse auction software. Reverse auction service providers
were unable to conduct the auction in real time without delays and were unable to
accommodate multiple bidding formats. This supports the theory that when selecting a
reverse auction provider, organizations should consider the track record of the enabler;
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the technology used and its flexibility and a contingency plan for technical or other
difficulties.
Vendors must be notified of unique requirements such as short delivery schedules.
In order to maximize competition, the Government should stop setting a reverse auction
reserve price and let the market drive the price.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this chapter is to draw conclusions based on the analysis
conducted in Chapter IV. Each investigative area question is answered, followed by
conclusions and recommendations. Then, the limitations of the research are presented
together with potential topics for future research.
Investigative Area 1: What is the nature of the Department Of Defense competitive
market when using reverse auctioning?
In each case, market research analysis was conducted to study practices in the
particular market segment. All four case studies provide a clearly defined requirement,
available from at least two competent vendors in the commercial, competitive
marketplace. This factor leads to the question of why did vendors say they would
participate in the reverse auction process but then did not?
In each case, the government anticipates more competition than received. In one
of the four reverse auctions only one vendor participated. During the market research
phase the buying activity received "buy- in" from the vendors but did not identify all
critical information for making an informed decision about whether to participate in the
reverse auction or not such as:
Short delivery period
Starting bid price
Pre-qualifications
The Air Force should continue analyzing the standard practices of the particular
market segment before determining to use a reverse auction. During the market research
phase, delivery requirements, pre-qualification requirements, and any other unique
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criteria should be revealed. This will allow vendors to access their competitiveness
before committing a lot of time and effort. Eliminating the "reserve" price set by the
Government will allow the vendors to start the reverse auction price and drive it
downward, maximizing competition.
Investigative Area 2: Can we use reverse auctions for other than low price,
Information Technology (IT)?
In each case the Air Force was able to consider criteria other than low price. Each
case effectively stated criteria such as past performance and technical requirements that
enabled the Air Force to limit the participation in the reverse auction to vendors that met
the pre-qualification requirements.
It is recommended that the Air Force continue using reverse auctioning for
procurements that have award criteria other than low price. However, assurances must be
made that pre-qualifications are not too restrictive, thereby eliminating competition and
creating a potential protest.
The conclusion of this research is that reverse auctioning can be used to award
contracts with award criteria other than low price. The Air Force successfully awarded
contracts from Case A, Case C, and Case D. Case B was not awarded from the reverse
auction results but its failure was not due to the award criteria.
Investigative Area 3: What are the primary limitations of the reverse auction
process?
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There are numerous limitations in the reverse auction process as identified in each
case study. Two primary limitations found in each case include the effectiveness of the
reverse auction service provider and the "reserve" starting price for the reverse auction.
Organizations must consider the following when selecting a reverse auction
provider:
a. The track record of the enabler, which should include number of
current and past clients; volume of business; and customer satisfaction
to include past performance to determine if they can provide what they
say they can;
b. The technology used, its flexibility, and;
c. Reverse auction service provider's contingency plan for technical or
other difficulties.
Vendors must be notified of unique requirements prior to receiving their buy-in.
During market research, organizations should identify any unique requirements involved
such as quick delivery. Also, organizations need to let the market drive the price of the
reverse auction and eliminate the starting price of the auction set by the Government.
Lessons Learned
In one case, the first article test requirement was deleted and replaced with
compliance to International Organization of Standardization, ISO 9002, which promotes
the development of international standards to facilitate the exchange of goods and
services worldwide. This is a good step toward true utilization of commercial procedures
versus unique military specifications and first article requirements.
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In one case, the solicitation was set up to anticipate problems with the reverse
auction process. Therefore, award could be made from the reverse auction process or the
second alternative was to discard the reverse auction results and request vendor's final
proposal revisions via mail.
Final Recommendation
It is recommended that the Air Force ensure that the reverse auction service
provider can provide adequate service to successfully conduct the auction. This should
allow the Air Force to use the reverse auctioning process without fear of receiving a
protest from vendors due to faulty software. To accomplish this may require a source
selection for a single USAF service provider, which will allow the Air Force to select one
vendor that can provide the most efficient and effective reverse auction services.
Additionally, it is recommended that the Air Force should eliminate the use of a
starting reverse auction price. In each case, this "reserve" price was set by the
Government and limited participation. Deletion of this starting bid price should
maximize participation and will allow the market to drive the price.
Vendors were evaluated on past performance and required to show they had
produced the item within the past three years. The Government must have a valid reason
to restrict this procurement to vendors that have produced the item within the past three
years. If there is no specific reason for this requirement, it is protestable. This is
evidenced by a letter of concern from one pre-qualified vendor that did not meet the
additional stringent past performance requirement. The letter of concern states the
Government was restricting competition by not allowing them to compete. With the use
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of commercial practices such as ISO standards, the vendor would have been able to
participate in the complete acquisition process.
Research Limitations
The Air Force has only used reverse auctioning to conduct four procurements for
other than Information Technology (IT). This small number of reverse auctions limits the
researchers ability to match patterns of more reverse auctions.
IT reverse auctions were not studied in this research effort. Therefore, the
findings from to IT reverse auctions could not be compared to the findings of this
research.
The characterization of a "successful" reverse auction was not defined. The
definition can vary depending on the perceptions of the vendors and the Government.
Recommendations for Future Research
The Air Force should study the reported reverse auction savings and determine if
all costs were considered. The additional costs that need to be measured are the
manpower resources utilized in receiving reverse auction training; the cost of the reverse
auction provider, and the cost of limited participants.
The Air Force should examine existing reverse auction service providers to
determine if software should be developed for Government usage. Currently, each
government office is responsible for obtaining the reverse auction service provider. This
is risky as was experienced in each case of this research. Some providers claim to have a
successful reverse auction system in place but fail to perform adequately during the
actual action when all players are involved. A source selection to select a single enabler
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would provide the Air Force with a tool to use by each office and should eliminate the
need for continual reverse auctioning training.
Study Air Force Information Technology reverse auctions and compare the results
of these auctions to the results of this research.
Reverse auctions may damage buyer-supplier relationships with the Government.
It is recommended that additional research be conducted to find out if the participating
vendors felt exploited by the reverse auction process and study how the reverse auctions
affect the DOD industrial supplier base.
Study the definition of a "successful" reverse auction from the Government and
vendor's perspective.
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Appendix A: Initial Contact with Primary Point Of Contacts
Original Message
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:

Marion Cynthia L CIV AFIT/ENV rmailto:Cvnthia.MarionfS.afit.edul
Tuesday, August 07,2001 10:26 AM
WRALC/PKOCA; OO-ALC/PKPQ; WRALC/LFKA
Reverse Auctions - Request for Thesis Data

TO:

Buyer, Wright-Patterson AFB OH (58390)
Buyer, Robin AFB GA (DSN 468-9287)
Buyer, Robins AFB GA (DSN 486-2477)
Buyer, Hill AFB UT (DSN 777-7807)

My name is Cindy Marion and I am a student at the Air Force Institute of
Technology, Graduate School of Engineering and Management, AFIT/ENV, WrightPatterson AFB OH. My e-mail address is: Cynthia.Marion@afit.edu I am working
on my thesis entitled Reverse Auctioning. My sponsor is AFMC/PKO,
Lt Col (S) Steve Elliott. He provided your name as a possible point of contact to
assist me in my thesis research.
Will you be able and willing to assist me in providing data? Specifically, answering
some general questions about the Reverse Auctioning process that you accomplished
and going through the contract file and providing documents such as the market
research, RFP, contract, possible protests, and any unique information/documents that
was related to your reverse auction, etc.
Please let me know as soon as possible if you can help via response to this e-mail.
Additionally, if you can help, please provide the aforementioned materials either via
e-mail or send to:
AFIT/ENV
Graduate School of Engineering & Management
ATTN: Cindy Marion, Student
Wright-Patterson AFB OH 45433
My timeline: I will contact you for a short interview via telephone or you may
complete the questions (I am still developing) and e-mail your response back to me. I
expect to contact you and complete the questions around the end of September or
toward to beginning of October. I can provide the questions earlier if this would be
more convenient.
Thank you for your time!
Again, please let me know if I can count on you to provide data for my thesis.
Cindy Marion, AFIT/ENV
Wright-Patterson AFB OH
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Appendix B: Investigative Questions
Investigative Area 1
What is the nature of the DOD competitive market when using reverse
auctioning? The intent of this question is to identify the characteristics of a competitive
market and determine what type of buyer-supplier relationship exists.
1. How is the nature of the DOD competitive market affected by reverse
auctioning?
2. How does reverse auctioning affect the type of supplier relationship
that is involved with the item being procured and what type of
relationship is needed?
3. How does reverse auctioning affect the DOD industrial base?
4. How did you determine if your reverse auction was to be restricted and
did you have any problems?
Investigative Area 2
Can we use reverse auctions for other than low price, information technology?
The intent of this question is to determine what factors, other than low price, can be
considered for award criteria of a reverse auction.
5. What are the award criteria and why was it selected?
Investigative Area 3
What are the primary limitations of the reverse auction process? The intent of this
question is to identify factors that limit the usefulness of a reverse auction.
6. Did you develop any special contract clauses for your reverse auction,
and, if so, what were they?
7. How was the selection of the reverse auction service provider made?
8. What were the primary limitations of the reverse auction process?
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Appendix C: Case A Open Coded Mind Map

Global Vendor Qualifies

Pfe-qualification
Best Value (PPT)

Comnpercially Availab/e
Numerous Vendors
RA Award

Low Bid
Entry Price Too
Low

One CLIN
Sluggish Computer
Government
Vendors
' Computer Connectivity Problem

Bid Process Is Time Consuming

Auction May Require Additional Personnel
waiver
Higher Level Inspection
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Appendix D: Case B Open Coded Mind Map

RA Thrown Out
Pre-qualification

Commercially Available

Protestable
One CLIN
Sluggish Computer
Government
Vendors
Time Constraints

First Article
igher Level Inspection
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Appendix E: Case C Open Coded Mind Map
Small Businesses

RA Award

Commercially Available

Government
Vendors

Bid Process Is Time Consuming

D

re-qualification

No Established Guidance

Appendix F: Case D Open Coded Mind Map
Technical Evaluation

RA Award
■Pre-qualification

Commercially Available

100% SB Set-Aside

Complaints

Government
Vendors

Special Provisions
Limited Participation
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Appendix G: Reverse Auction Instructions and Agreement

1. WR-ALC at Robins AFB will conduct a competitive, anonymous, on-line reverse
auction for. WR-ALC has teamed with the US Army Communications and Electronics
Command (CECOM) to conduct the reverse auction for this requirement. The URL for
the reverse auction is http ://abop.monmouth.army.mil. Interested parties shall contact the
Contracting Office at Robins AFB to receive a username and password for the reverse
auction.
2. If a participant would like a demonstration of the reverse auctioning tool, contact this
office at least one week prior to commencement of the auction. All signed documents
required by this action shall be sent to this office by fax or by email. (Electronically
signed documents shall be readable in MS Word or Adobe PDF format.)
3. Proposal submission. This acquisition will be made by reverse auction procedures.
Only sources whose offers are determined to be technically acceptable may participate in
the reverse auction. Participants will use the reverse auctioning tool developed by
CECOM currently in a pilot phase. This is a competitive, anonymous, on-line auction in
which participants will submit a series of bids that descend in price. By participating in
this reverse auction you grant the government the right to disclose your prices, however
your name will be kept ano nymous.
Procedures for the auction:
4. At 1:30pm EST on 06Dec00 the auction shall commence and at 2:30pm EST the
auction shall close unless an extension is given. The Army site server clock identifies the
"Approx. Time of Close". The system will automatically extend the closing time should
a bid be placed within the last five minutes of the auction. Further, if an extension period
is generated and a quote is submitted at any time within the extension period, another five
minutes extension period will be generated, otherwise the reverse auction will close.
There will be no limits on the number of extensions in this reverse auction.
5. During the reverse auction, contractors may bid as often as they want, but shall bid
only on the total quantity of 100 Kits. Prices entered on the web site shall be for unit
prices only. Contractors are not required to revise their prices during the reverse auction.
Contractor's quotes must differ from the market-leading quote by at least the decrement
identified in the "Auction Details" at the Reverse Auction web site. Ensure you
complete all required blanks on the web site prior to submitting a quote, and check the
appropriate boxes. Contractors will submit revised pricing only through the online web
site specified above during the reverse auction. Contracting Officer will not accept
revised pricing via any other mechanism including but not limited to post, courier, fax, email, or orally unless specifically requested by the contracting officer. Once the reverse
auction is complete, all contractors shall submit a signed copy of their price quote to the
point of contact above.
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6. The Contracting Officer reserves the right to make no award under this procedure. The
contracting officer also reserves the right to suspend or cancel the reverse auction at any
time. If the contracting officer cancels the reverse auction, the order may be processed
using normal procedures.
7. By participating in the reverse auction, contractors certify they will not knowingly
disclosure their prices to any other quoter except anonymously during the on- line reverse
auction. The Contractor further certifies that anonymous disclosure of its prices during
the reverse auction shall not be for the purposes of restricting competition.
8. Contractors are required to sign the SF 1449 and return to this office prior to receiving
a user ID and Logon password. By signing this document, contractors agree to abide by
the terms of this reverse auction agreement.
9. Provide the name of the individual who will represent your company during the
reverse auction.

(insert name and phone number)
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